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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
LEWIS RICKY DURAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030851-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction for one count of aggravated arson, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-103 (2003). This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)0) (2002). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Should this Court consider defendant's claim of insufficient evidence where he 
has not marshaled the evidence in favor of the jury's verdict? 
In the alternative, was the evidence sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated 
arson of his own apartment, where he was about to be forcibly evicted, had already 
vandalized the apartment and threatened his neighbors, and was seen in the apartment 
just before the fire started? 
In reviewing a claim for insufficient evidence, this Court ccview[s] the evidence and all 
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict." State v. Holgate 
2000 UT 74, 1118, 10 P.3d 346. This Court may reverse the jury's verdict only if ctthe 
evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime.955 Id. at 
1118 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Defendant's appeal requires application of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-103 (1999), which 
states the following: 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of fire or explosives he 
intentionally and unlawfully damages: 
(a) a habitable structure; or 
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person not a participant in the 
offense is in the structure or vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the first degree. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 1,2003, defendant was charged with one count of Aggravated Arson, a first 
degree felony (R.l-2). At his jury trial, defendant presented no evidence and never moved 
for a directed verdict (R. 136:164-65). The jury convicted him as charged (R. 74, 83, 
136:204-205). The court sentenced defendant to the statutory prison term (R. 90, 138:8). 
Defendant timely appealed to this Court (R. 93). This Court transferred the case the Utah 
Supreme Court, which poured the case back over to this Court (R. 100; Order, dated 
December 4, 2003, Case No. 20030851-SC).1 
1
 The pour-over order is not in the trial court record. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the early hours of March 31, 2003, a fire destroyed the interior of defendant's 
apartment (R. 136:111-12, 135-50). The fire marshals determined that the fire was 
intentionally started (R. 136:158). When police located and took defendant into custody on 
suspicion of arson, he told them that he no longer wanted to pay for food and rent and 
demanded, "[T]ake me to fucking jail" (R. 136:84). 
Defendant was being evicted 
Defendant moved into apartment number two at 2621 Madison in July 2002 (R. 
136:107-08). He made regular rental payments at first, but later slipped behind and made 
only small partial payments (R. 136:109). In early March 2003, the landlord instituted 
eviction proceedings against defendant (R. 136:115-120, Stated Ex. No. 1). Defendant 
received a three-day notice to pay rent or quit on March 4,2003 (R. 136:116-17). Defendant 
did not respond to the notice (R. 136:117). Subsequently, defendant's landlord served him 
with a summons and order on March 18, requesting a response within three days (R. State's 
Ex. No.l). Defendant filed a delinquent response on March 24, 2003 (R. 136:118). On 
March 25,2003, officials served defendant with an order of restitution giving him three days 
to evacuate the apartment (R. State's Ex. No. 1). The order stated that if defendant failed to 
evacuate within the three-day period, law enforcement officials would force him off the 
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premises (R. State's Ex. No. 1). Defendant's landlord planned to have the sheriff forcibly 
remove defendant from the apartment on March 31, 2003 (R. 136:119). 
During this same time period, the other tenants reported that defendant became more 
and more antagonistic (R. 136:21-22,61-64). He made rude comments and threatened some 
of the tenants (R. 136:21-22, 61-64.). Defendant said to one female tenant, "Just you wait, 
I 'm going to split that butt wide open" (R. 136:21). He later accused that tenant's husband of 
stealing his papers and said, "I don't care if you're the one that done it or not, if it happens 
again, I'm coming after you" (R. 136:22). Another tenant recalled, "I was walking down to 
the bus stop . . . and [defendant] got up in my face saying, I'm going to get you, I'm going to 
get you" (R. 136:63). Defendant also started banging on his pipes at two and three o'clock in 
the morning (R. 136:62-63). The banging started in February two or three times a week (R. 
136:62). By March, defendant would bang on his pipes every night (R. 136:22, 62-63). 
Defendant was acting "weird" 
On March 31, 2003, shortly after 1:00 a.m., Robert Nelson visited defendant's 
apartment complex to borrow a pack of cigarettes from Scott Cole, defendant's neighbor (R. 
136:28-29, 41-42, 65-67). Nelson passed defendant in the hallway on the way to Cole's 
apartment. (R. 136:30-31). He said "hi" to defendant, but defendant did not respond (R. 
Officer Rustin Olson testified that at the time of the fire the landlord told him 
defendant had been evicted the morning of March 30, 2003 at 9:30 a.m. (R. 136:87). 
However, the laadlord's testimony at trial indicated that the forcible eviction had not yet 
occurred at the time of the fire and that it was to occur at 9:30 a.m. the morning the fire 
started (R. 136:119). Officer Olson admitted that he wrote the report at five o'clock in the 
morning and that it contained a mistake (R. 136:87). 
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136:30-31). Defendant was acting "weird," repeatedly "coming out of his house . . . and 
onto the porch [,] looking around [,] shifting his feet, [then] turning around [and] going back 
into the apartment as if he was waiting for something or someone" (R. 136:30-31, 57). 
Robert explained to defendant that he was "just going to be a minute, I'm visiting a friend" 
(R. 136:31). He felt like he was interrupting something (R. 136:31). When Robert departed 
around 1:10 or 1:15 a.m., defendant was still acting "weird," pacing in and out of his 
apartment (R. 136:31,57). 
At 1:29 a.m. one of defendant's neighbor's, Melissa Snuffer, awoke to the smell of 
smoke and called 911 to report a fire (R. 136:19,75). Police officers arrived around 1:30 a.m. 
and assisted Melissa and her fiancee in waking and evacuating the other apartment residents 
(R. 136:74-76). Nobody could find defendant, and Melissa could not get his apartment door 
open (R. 136:20-21, 24-25). By the time the police officers had evacuated everybody, the 
fire department had located the fire in defendant's apartment and put it out (R. 136:76). 
Fire marshals arrived at 3:00 a.m. to locate the cause of the fire (R. 136:135). They 
determined that the fire began in a pile of garbage behind the couch and next to the kitchen 
(R. 136:140,142-153,157; State's Ex. Nos. 2-13). Marshals concluded from the lack of any 
evidence of an accidental cause that the fire was intentionally started (R. 136:139, 158). 
They also found several holes in defendant's apartment walls (R. 136:146). The holes were 
not there when defendant moved into the apartment (R. 136:113). 
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"Take meto... jail." 
While the fire marshals were conducting their inspection, defendant returned to his 
apartment and asked what was going on (R. 136:159). The marshals responded that they 
were "investigating a fire and he needed to step out of the house" (R. 136:159). Defendant 
told them to "get the T' out, [they] had no right to be in his home" (R. 136:160). The 
marshals stepped out of the apartment and called the police (R. 136:160). 
Police officers returned and took defendant into custody (R. 136:81). Defendant was 
jumpy and emotional (R. 136:83). He told officers that he left his apartment at midnight to 
go buy methamphetamine (R. 136:82). He claimed that his friend Shaun Peat was at the 
apartment when he left (R. 136:83). The interviewing officer then asked defendant if he left 
his oven on or if he smoked cigarettes (R. 136:83-84). Defendant cut him off and said 
"who's fucking dick do I have to suck to go to prison?" (R. 136:83-84). He continued and 
explained that he did not want to have to pay for rent or food and he "couldn't sling enough 
dope to support his own habit" (R. 136:84). He then demanded, "[TJake me to fucking jail" 
(R. 136:84). 
During the subsequent investigation, the State learned that Shaun Peat, defendant's 
alibi, was in De Soto, Illinois at the time of the fire (R. 136:124-25). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence supporting the jury verdict. 
Defendant has the burden, when claiming insufficient evidence, to present every scrap of 
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evidence introduced at trial that supports the jury's verdict. Defendant has not done so, and 
this Court should therefore refuse to review his insufficiency claim. 
Further, even assuming defendant properly marshaled the evidence, his insufficiency 
claim would still fail because the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to convict. 
Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction if the fair inferences of the 
evidence have a basis in logic and human experience. In the instant case, defendant was seen 
in his apartment shortly before the fire started. He was being evicted by his landlord and had 
already vandalized the apartment and threatened his neighbors. Defendant later told police 
that he could no longer afford food, rent, or drugs and asked to be taken to jail. The fair 
inference from the evidence is that defendant started the fire out of desperation and as an act 
of malice towards his landlord and the other residents in the building. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S 
CLAIM BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS NOT MARSHALED THE 
EVIDENCE; MOREOVER, DEFENDANT'S CLAIM IS MERITLESS 
BECAUSE THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT 
HIM 
Defendant claims that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him of 
aggravated arson. Aplt. Br. at 8. Specifically, he argues that "[t]he evidence against [him] 
was circumstantial" because "[t]here were no witnesses to the fire." Aplt. Br. at 8. 
Defendant acknowledges that he did not preserve his claim in the trial court by moving for a 
directed verdict. Aplt. Br. at 8. He contends, however, that his trial attorney was ineffective 
for not filing a directed verdict motion. Aplt. Br. at 8-9. In the alternative, he claims the 
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trial court committed plain error by not sua sponte dismissing the case at the close of the 
State's evidence. Aplt. Br. at 9. 
This Court should refuse to address defendant's sufficiency claim because he failed to 
marshal the evidence. Even if defendant had marshaled the evidence, however, his claims of 
ineffectiveness and plain error still fail because the evidence was sufficient. 
A. This Court need not reach defendant's sufficiency claim because 
defendant failed to marshal the evidence. 
"It is well established that a defendant's burden on appeal when challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence after a jury trial is to marshal the evidence in support of the 
verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict" State v. Silva, 2000 UT App 292, H 25, 13 P.3d 604 (quotations 
omitted); see also State v. Martinez, 2002 UT App 126, II40,47 P.3d 115 (holding that when 
a defendant challenges the sufficiency of evidence on appeal, he must "marshal all relevant 
evidence presented at trial which tends to support the findings and demonstrate why the 
findings are clearly erroneous" (quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 
1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991)). "To meet this burden, an appellant 'must present in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very findings the appellant resists.5" Martinez, 2002 UT App 126, H 40 
(quoting West Valley City 818 P.2d at 1315). "After compiling all evidence in support of the 
verdict, the appellant must then show that there is a flaw in the evidence, sufficient to show 
that the verdict is clearly erroneous." Id.; see also State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470,472 (Utah 
App. 1991) (holding that when a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence he 
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must marshal all evidence, including circumstantial evidence). Defendant has failed to meet 
this burden. 
Though defendant lists some evidence introduced at trial, he fails to include all of the 
evidence supporting the jury's finding. For example, defendant fails to mention that 
defendant's door could not be opened when his neighbor, the first person at defendant's 
apartment, tried to notify defendant of the fire (R. 136:20, 24-25). Instead, his brief only 
states that he often kept his door open and that the police found the door unlocked. Aplt. Br. 
at 13. Further, defendant mentions only two eviction notifications. Aplt. Br. at 7. Defendant 
actually received three eviction notices (R. State's Ex. No. 1). Defendant also fails to include 
any evidence of his antagonistic behavior leading up to commission of the crime, such as the 
nightly banging on pipes and the fire investigator's discovery of several holes in his 
apartment walls (R.136: 20, 62-63, 68-69). 
Because defendant failed to meet his burden to adequately marshal the evidence, this 
court should refuse to review defendant's sufficiency claim. See State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 
98, f 16, 989 P.2d 1065 (declining to review sufficiency of evidence where defendant does 
not marshal evidence). 
B. The properly marshaled evidence was sufficient to convict defendant 
Even had defendant properly marshaled the evidence, defendant's claim would fail 
because the evidence demonstrates he committed the crime. 
This court "will not lightly overturn a jury verdict." State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, H 
42, 994 P.2d 177; see also State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997) (holding a 
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defendant claiming insufficient evidence "faces a high hurdle in establishing this claim"). 
"This [C]ourt has limited authority to examine a jury verdict challenged on the sufficiency of 
the evidence." Scheel, 823 P.2d at 472. It must therefore "view[ ] the evidence and all 
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict." Holgate, 2000 
UT 74, If 18. It may reverse a jury verdict only if "the evidence i s sufficiently inconclusive 
or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime.'" Id. at HI8 (quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 
1212); see also Scheel, 823 P.2d at 472; Colwell 2000 UT 8,11 42; State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 
at 344; State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah 1986); State v. Linden, 666 P.2d 875, 875 
(Utah 1983) (holding that court may only reverse arson conviction if "reasonable minds must 
necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt"). Thus, "[wjhen findings of 
all required elements of the crime can be reasonably made from the evidence, including the 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, [appellate courts] stop their inquiry and 
sustain the verdict." Colwell, 2000 UT 8, H42. 
"[I]t is a well-settled rule that circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to 
establish the guilt of the accused." Nickles 728 P.2d at 126; see also Brown, 948 P.2d at 344 
(holding that "a conviction can be based on sufficient circumstantial evidence"); Scheel, 823 
P.2d at 472. "Circumstantial evidence need not be regarded as inferior evidence if it is of 
such quality and quantity as to justify a jury in determining guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and is sufficient to sustain the conviction." Nickles, 728 P.2d at 127; see also State v. Span, 
819 P.2d 329,332 (Utah 1991) (same). To decide whether sufficient circumstantial evidence 
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exists, this Court determines "(1) whether there is any evidence that supports each and every 
element of the crime charged, and (2) whether the inferences that can be drawn from that 
evidence have a basis in logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove each 
legal element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Brown, 948 P.2d at 344. 
"Utah Courts have determined that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain an 
arson conviction." Scheel, 823 P.2d at 472; see also Span, 819 P.2d at 332-33 (holding 
evidence sufficient to prove aggravated arson where evidence included defendant's anger 
over breakup with girlfriend, his prior vandalism of her car, and his proximity to her 
apartment the night of the fire); Nickles, 728 P.2d at 126-27 (noting in arson case "a well-
settled rule that circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to establish the guilt of the 
accused . . . if it is of such quality and quantity as to justify a jury in determining guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt, and is sufficient to sustain a conviction"); State v. Showaker, 721 P.2d 
892, 892-93 (Utah 1986) (finding "substantial credible evidence" to sustain arson conviction 
where there was a threat to cause fire, timely opportunity, and handprint); State v. Clark, 675 
P.2d 557, 562 (Utah 1983) (finding sufficient evidence to convict where evidence 
demonstrated that accelerants were used, defendants were present, and defendants' legs were 
burned); State v. Dronzank, 671 P.2d 199,200 (Utah 1983) ("In viewing the case in light of 
the totality of the evidence, the offense may be established by circumstantial evidence. Such 
evidence may be the only way of establishing a case of [aggravated] arson, which usually is 
based on secret preparation and activity."); State v. Bergwerff, 111 P.2d 510,511 (Utah App. 
1989) (sufficient evidence to convict homeowner of aggravated arson where fire started from 
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spilt oil on carpet in home shortly after homeowners left on vacation); State v. Morehouse, 
748 P.2d 217, 218-19 (Utah App. 1988) (holding evidence sufficient where witnesses saw 
defendant enter and leave burned building at time of fire and defendant had possible financial 
motive). 
Aggravated arson occurs when a person "by means of fire or explosives . . . 
intentionally and unlawfully damages: (a) a habitable structure; or (b) any structure or vehicle 
when any person not a participant in the offense is in the structure or vehicle." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-103 (2003). Defendant does not dispute that the fire damaged a habitable 
structure. He claims only that the evidence was insufficient to prove "how the fire was 
started or who was responsible for starting it." Aplt. Br. at 16. 
Although nobody saw defendant start the fire, the properly marshaled evidence is 
sufficient for a jury to infer that defendant intentionally started the fire in his apartment. 
Defendant had become increasingly antagonistic towards the other tenants and abusive 
towards the apartment (R. 136:21-22, 61-64). Defendant kept the other tenants up at night 
by banging on his pipes, and fire investigators found several holes in defendant's apartment 
walls that were not there when he moved into the apartment (R. 136:22, 62-63, 113). 
Defendant also made rude comments to or physically threatened at least three of his 
neighbors (R. 136:21-22, 61-64). 
In March, defendant's landlord instituted eviction proceedings against him. Defendant 
received notices on March 4 and March 18 demanding that he pay rent or evacuate the 
premises (R. 136:115-20; State's Ex. No. 1). He received a final notice on March 25,2003, 
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telling him to evacuate the premises within three business days or he would be forced to 
leave (R. State's Ex. No. 1). Three business days later defendant still inhabited the apartment 
(R. 136:118-19; State's Ex. No. 1). 
Defendant was in or near his apartment shortly before the fire started. Robert Nelson 
saw defendant pacing in and out of his apartment around 1:10-1:15 in the morning when he 
left Scott Cole's apartment (R. 136:31, 57).3 At 1:29 a.m., one of defendant's neighbor's, 
Melissa Snuffer, awoke to the smell of smoke and called 911 to report a fire (R. 136:19,75). 
Scott Cole testified that someone alerted him to the fire about ten minutes after Robert 
Nelson left his apartment (R. 136:58). When Melissa evacuated the other residents during 
the fire, she could not open defendant's door (R. 136:20-21). 
Fire Marshal Matthew Schwenk testified that the origin of the fire was a pile of 
garbage on the floor in between the couch and the kitchen (R. 136:137, 139). He found no 
evidence that the garbage ignited from an electrical short or other accidental cause (R. 
136:152). While he could not be sure of the exact mechanism that ignited the fire, he 
testified without contradiction that the fire was intentionally started (R. 136:158). 
Defendant made incriminating statements to the police after the fire. At first, 
defendant lied to police about having an alibi. He claimed that Shaun Peat was at his 
apartment when he left before the fire started (R. 136:83). However, Shaun's testimony, as 
well as that of his parole officer, revealed that he was not in Utah, but in De Soto, Illinois 
Scott Cole testified that he keeps his clock set ahead about ten to fifteen minutes 
depending on the clock. R. 136:72. The clock read 1:25 when Robert Nelson arrived, so it 
could have been as early as 1:10 in the morning (R. 136:72). 
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that day (R. 136:124-25). Defendant then spontaneously exclaimed, "[Wjho's fucking dick 
do I have to suck to go to prison?" (R. 136:84.). He stated that he did not want to have to pay 
for rent or food and he "couldn't sling enough dope to support his own habit" (R. 136:84). 
He then demanded, "[T]ake me to fucking jail" (R. 136:84). 
Defendant was also antagonistic towards the fire marshals. When he returned to his 
apartment, he told the marshals to "get the T ' out, [they] had no right to be in his home" and 
impeded their investigation (R. 136:160). 
The jury could logically and reasonably infer from the evidence that defendant 
intentionally set his apartment on fire. First, they could infer that he was motivated by malice 
to start the fire. He was upset with his neighbors and had reason to be upset with his 
landlord. He had also previously vandalized the apartment and antagonized his neighbors. 
The jury could also infer that defendant started the fire as a desperate plan to use 
imprisonment as a welfare system. He was facing eminent eviction from his home and could 
no longer afford to buy food, pay rent, or support his drug habit. When the police caught 
defendant, he explained his desperate circumstances and demanded that they take him to jail. 
The jury could also infer from defendant's actions after the fire that he was trying to 
hide the source of the fire and his proximity to it. Defendant lied to police to hide the fact 
that he was in his apartment shortly before the fire started. He also drove the fire marshals 
out of his apartment so that they could not discover the source and cause of the fire. 
The State's evidence permitted the jury to infer that defendant had a motive to start the 
fire and that he attempted to hide the evidence of arson. A conclusion of guilt from these 
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inferences is strengthened by Nelson's observation that defendant was nervously pacing in 
and out of his apartment just before the fire started. The confluence of motive, culpable 
conduct, and proximity to the fire make it logical and reasonable to infer that defendant 
intentionally started the fire. 
Courts have sustained convictions for arson on less evidence than was presented in the 
instant case. For example, in State v. Span, the Utah Supreme Court held that the following 
circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated arson of his 
girlfriend's apartment: 1) fire investigators found the fire was intentionally set; 2) Span was 
upset about a recent break-up with his girlfriend nine days before the fire; 3) sometime 
between the break-up and the fire, the defendant committed two acts of vandalism against his 
girlfriend's car; 4) defendant admitted to a witness that he had driven to his girlfriend's 
apartment sometime near the time of the fire. See Span, 819 P.2d at 332-33. The court 
concluded that, though the circumstantial evidence used to convict the defendant was "close 
on the issues of whether the fire was arson and whether Span was the perpetrator of the 
arson, 'there [was] some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings of 
all the requisite elements of the crime [could] reasonably be made '" Id. at 333 (quoting 
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) (alterations in original, emphasis added); see 
also Morehouse, 748 P.2d at 218-19 (holding evidence sufficient to identify defendant as 
arsonist where witnesses saw defendant enter and leave burned building at time of fire and 
defendant had possible financial motive). 
Thus defendant's claim fails. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's conviction 
and sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2-5 day of June 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
MATTHEW D. BATES 
Assistant Attorney General 
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